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Comment on Professor Van Alstyne's
Paper
Henry Paul Monaghan*

My major difficulty with Professor Van Alstyne's paper is its incomplete character. In the end, he makes only two points: first, judges are
authorized to apply "this Constitution," not to do justice; 1 and second,
judges should not lie about what they are doing. 2 The danger is that after
a while the first point sounds somewhat empty, while the actual content of
the second point seems entirely parasitic on the first.
Van Alstyne and I have always started from common ground: the
judicial function is to apply "this Constitution," not to revise or update it.
Unlike Martha Field, I believe that many deny the substance of our
position. For example, Paul Brest insists that there are really two Constitutions, one written and the other unwritten. 3 For Brest, the lex non scripta
empowers judges to impose their conceptions of social justice on the body
politic.4 The substance of our position also is denied by academics like
Frank Michelman who seek to tease welfare rights out of the fourteenth
amendment. 5 Of course, Michelman would object that interpretation is a
complex idea, and that in fact he is doing interpretation. But there are
bounds to what constitutes legitimate interpretation, and for me Michelman
has passed them. Still others, like Laurence Tribe, generalize original
understanding at such a high level of abstraction that they empty it of all
operative content. 6 In sum, perhaps a majority of judges and commentators
have long ago abandoned "this Constitution."
I do not find attractive the idea that the Constitution licenses judges to
impose their views of justice on society. Just think of the way in which
judges are trained and socialized. Judges constitute an elite group whose
self-confidence is seldom matched by genuine learning. Moreover, in any
interesting case there is no agreement about what justice entails. Why then
should five justices have power to impose their views on 250 million
people? But while, with Van Alstyne, I believe that the only judicial warrant
*Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University Law School.
A.B. 1955, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; LLB. 1958, Yale University; LL.M. 1960,
Harvard University.
1. See Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part II, Antinomial Choices and The
Role of the Supreme Court, 72 IowA L. REv. 1281, 1298-99 (1987).
2. See id.
3. See Brest, The Misconceived (btestfor Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 224-28
(1980).
• 4. See id. at 228-29.
5. See generally Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U .L.Q.
659; Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory ofJustice,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through tlze Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
6. Professor Tribe outlines his theory of constitutional interpretation in L. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 3-44 (1985).
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is to apply "this Constitution," application requires interpretation. The
difficulty comes once one starts unpacking the idea of what counts as
legitimate interpretation. I emphasize the word "legitimate" because a
theory of interpretation is ultimately a political theory-political in the best
sense of the word. At this point the incomplete character of Van Alstyne's
paper becomes troublesome. Although Van Alstyne and I would both be
listed as interpretivists, we disagree about a great many cases; this proves
that no a priori guarantee exists that the interpretivist approach to the
Constitution yields any less disagreement.
DisagTeement is not the most serious difficulty faced by interpretivism;
potential irrelevance is. I will illustrate my point by describing my course in
civil liberties. The course deals with the due process and equal protection
clauses, and basically is organized around five cases. I suggest that each of
these cases was incorrectly decided as a matter of original understanding.
First, Lochner v. New York 7 was decided incorrectly, though some
defense could be mounted that "this Constitution" was designed to prevent
redistributive legislation, and that is all which was involved there. Second,
Roe v. Wade 8 is also clearly incorrect in my view. Third, under a restrained
theory of original understanding, so is Brown v. Board of Education. 9 Yet I
noticed that in his remarks Van Alstyne distanced himself from this
position. The Congress that submitted the fourteenth amendment for
ratification, however, also segregrated the schools of the District of Columbia. This conduct was consistent with the general understanding then that
section 1 of the fourteenth amendment embraced only civil rights, not
political and social rights. 10 Van Alstyne seeks to avoid this difficulty by
invoking wme notion of a change in empirical assumptions about the
nature of public education.1 1 Moreover, Van Alstyne fails to defend his
m:tjor premise that in original understanding theory one can escape
disfavored results by positing that changing empirical assumptions somehow trump other kinds of factors, such as the "legal" content of the original
rule. 1~ Put differently, there is a great deal of controversial interpretivist
theory buried in Van Alstyne's efforts to escape the original-understanding
criticism of Brown v. Board of Education.
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (New York law regulating bakers' work hours unconstitutionally
resLricts liberry of contract protected by fourteenth amendment due process clause).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas statute criminalizing abortions performed for reasons other
than sa,•ing mother's life unconstitutionally deprives liberty protected by fourteenth amendment due process clause).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregation in public schools deprives black students of equal
protection of laws as guaranteed by fourteenth amendment).
10. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, libeny, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
I 1. Sn: Van Alstyne, Remarks at the Symposium, "In Celebration of the Bicentennial of the
United States Constitution," at the University of Iowa College of Law (Oct. 17, 1986)
(transcript on file at the Iowa Law Review).
12. Sre id.
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The decisions holding that sex is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification 13 is a fourth set of cases that is plainly wrong if measured against
original understanding. While it is not fashionable actually to read the
fourteenth amendment, section 2 of the amendment itself contains a sex
classification. 14 The fifth incorrectly decided case is Reynolds v. Sims, 15 the
one-person, one-vote case. At least as it applies to state elections, this
principle is quite doubtful as a matter of original understanding. These five
cases raise very serious problems-ones which the Van Alstyne theory will
have to deal with at some point.
Van Alstyne's paper says nothing about the role of precedent in
constitutional adjudication. For me, precedent is a trump against original
understanding because it prevents too much cognitive dissonance. Psychologically speaking, I could not believe both (a) that original understanding
constitutes the only legitimate canon for constitutional interpretation, and
(b) that most twentieth-century case law must be repudiated. But the real
question is whether acceptable public justifications can be advanced for
privileging stare decisis over original understanding. I am hard at work on
a paper on that subject now. The problems are difficult. To randomly name
just a few: What is the source and content of a rule that would privilege
stare decisis over original understanding? What does it mean to say that the
constitutional text is "always there?" If you think about the nature of "this
Constitution" as it actually appears in the process of constitutional adjudication, there is at least a sense in which "this Constitution" does not exist at
all. As the Constitution gets older and older, the text recedes further and
further into the background. In some areas, the text is only deep background for the problem at issue. Several years ago, Van Alstyne published
a very interesting article in which he parsed each of the words of the first
amendment. 16 The exercise was very well done and instructive. But the text
of the first amendment does not have any real directive force in constitutional adjudication except to fix the outer boundaries of judicial concern.
The development of the Bill of Rights has been essentially in the commonlaw mode of adjudication. In my own mind, I am not at all sure what it
means to be an interpretivist.
The question of precedent aside, Van Alstyne does not address,
overtly at least, the philosophical and epistemological premises of the
interpretivist position. What does it mean to interpret a text? Arguably, this
has been the dominant problem in western thought for the last twenty-five
years. Many have heard of structuralism, post-structuralism, decon13. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Court applies intermediate level of scrutiny in
striking down Oklahoma drinkinjs age law discriminating between sexes).
Note that I use the word "sex' and not "gender," being still a retrograde on the point of
grammar. Until a decade ago, what we now call "gender discrimination" was clearly
unde11tood as "sex discrimination."
14. The legislative apportionment provision of§ 2 refers to voting rights as attaching only
to male citizens. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 2.
15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (in striking down Alabama legislative apportionment plan based on
1900 census, Court holds that state legislatures must be apportioned according to one-person,
one-vote principle); Monaghan, The Bicentennial Constitution, 88 Cou:M. L. REv._
(forthcoming).
16. Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982).
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structionism, the Frankfurt School, and hermeneutical studies, and are
familiar with names such as Derrida, Gadamer, Harold Blum, and Stanley
Fish. Th<:·y are all concerned with the same problem: what does it mean to
claim you are "interpreting" a text? One does not get very far by saying that
the judicial function is to "apply 'this Constitution."' Application requires
interpretation, and the overriding question is what are to count as legitimate intepretivist premises.
By way of conclusion, the study of constitutional law on the whole in
this coun1 ry has proceeded from either one of two axes. One has been to try
to reconcile the institution of judicial review with democratic political
theory. That is the aim of the books by Deans Ely 17 and Choper. 18 In a way,
it is odd to start here. The real question is not how to reconcile the
Constitutwn itself with democratic theory. An interpretivist might very well
say, "I do not care whether or not the Constitution is democratic. It is
largely democratic, and to the extent it is not I will enforce it anyway." That
is exactly what I would do.
The other way to approach the theory of judicial review is to start at
the other end by asking what it means to "interpret" the Constitution. This
is Van Alstyne's approach, and my own. When you start at our end,
however, you inevitably wind up in the area of political theory. Language
i-5 not neutral; it is not an ontological given. In the end, it is necessary to
develop some kind of a political theory of what it means to make a
legitimate interpretation. Not surprisingly, this is the point at which the
great divide occurs.
Professor Field points out that the whole notion of original understanding may be incoherent because original understanding can be stated
in several different forms. 19 The level of generality of the stated original
intent is decisive. 20 Some writers state intent at so abstract a level that it is
eliminated as an operative constraint. I have an opposite tendency to state
original intent at a very low level of generality. Van Alstyne's paper has
nothing to say on this subject.
Van Alstyne's second point is that judges should not lie. 21 Although
the point itself is not controversial, its generality hides some complex ideas,
such as whether the opinion must contain all the reasons inducing the
judgment. I will respond in the terms that Van Alstyne seems concerned
with. I read all the Supreme Court cases year after year. It is an unsettling
experience. If you disagree consistently and strongly enough with the
opinions cf various justices, it is easy to conclude that they are either "fools
or knaves." The fools one knows. But in concluding that the nonfools must
be knaves, the danger is mistaking deep doctrinal disagreement for lying.
For example, the looseness with which the Court plays with precedent is
dfoturbing. Chief Justice Rehnquist is mentioned in this respect, but justice
17.J.

ELY, DBIOCR,\C\' AND D1s-rneST: A THEORY OF JuDICI.\L REVIEW (1980).
CttOPFR, jl'DKI.\L REV!fll' AND Tl-IE NATIO:"IAL PoLJTICAL PROCESS:
ONSIDfR.\lION OF THE RoLE OF THE St.:PREME CocRT (1980).

l8.J.
RI'•

A
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19. Sn• Field, f/011est Difference,, in Discerning the Constitution's .'1,feamng-The Task of Defining
C11111llturi,111al RiKht1for Persons Who Art Retarded, 72 Io11'A L. REV. 1301, 1305 (1987).
20. St'<' 111.
21. See Vr·n Alstyne, supra note 1, at 1298-99.
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Brennan is at least equally facile with precedent. This is not a charge of
lying, however. Behind the handling of precedents are deep and powerful
disagreements about the nature of constitutional adjudication.
The real danger is not lying, but self-deception. Governor Winthrop
once described judges as gods on earth. Being a Justice on the Supreme
Court is an occupation designed to make one forget that he or she is only
human. Power may not corrupt, but it can distort vision. The reason judicial
review works at all is that judges have internalized a general set of
constraining conceptions about what their offices are. My guess is that the
longer one stays, the weaker the constraints become. For this reason,
Supreme Court Justices should be retired after some limited period of
service, or after having reached seventy years of age. Moreover, to mention
a different concern, the idea of five members of the Supreme Court
bordering eighty years of age and deciding a wide range of hard cases is
quite unacceptable. This is not a job for octogenarians.
What keeps these elders on the Supreme Court is their belief that they
are indispensable. They believe that one more case is going to come up in
this or that area in which they can set the law forever. Of course, legal
development never works out that way. There are no indispensable persons
in this country, and the framers did not fashion life tenure for judges on a
belief that judges were indispensable. The framers provided life tenure for
federal judges because the payment of pensions seemed "inexpedient" in
1787.22 At the very least, life tenure and prolonged tenure for Supreme
Court Justices exacerbate the problem of self-deception.
0

22. See

THE FEDERALisr

No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

